

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/PV.241
17 February 1966
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIRST MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 17 February 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

U MAUNG MAUNG

(Burma)

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Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO
Mr. G. de CARVALHO SILOS
Mr. C. H. PAULINO PRATES

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV
Mr. Y. GOLEMANOV
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
Mr. D. POPOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS
Mr. S. F. RAE
Mr. C. J. MARSHALL
Mr. P. D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. Z. CERNIK
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. R. KLEIN

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ABERRA
Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI
Mr. K. P. LUKOSE
Mr. K. P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI
Mr. S. AVETTA
Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO
Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. G. O. IJEWERE
Mr. O. O. ADESOLA

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. C. UNGUREANU
Mr. A. COROLIANU

Sweden:

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. O. A. GRINEVSKY
Mr. V. V. SHUSTOV
Mr. G. K. EFIMOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF
Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. M. SHAKER

United Kingdom:

Sir Harold BEELEY
Mr. J. G. TAHOURDIN
Miss E. J. M. RICHARDSON
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United States of America:

Mr. W. C. FOSTER
Mr. C. H. TIMBERLAKE
Mr. D. S. MACDONALD
Mr. G. BUNN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. P. P. SPINELLI

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I declare open the two hundred and forty-first plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Speaking as the representative of Burma, I very much regret that, owing to unavoidable circumstances, I was not able to join my colleagues earlier. Nevertheless, I know that I shall be able to benefit from their experience and the wisdom of their counsel.

I should also like to join other members of the Committee in extending my deep condolences to the delegation of India on the untimely loss of Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, who in his lifetime did so much for peace and good will among nations. Throughout history India and Burma have been very close and friendly. In modern times the two peoples have been drawn even closer together by common aspirations. The late Prime Minister of India, by his visit to Burma, gave even greater expression to the deep and strong bonds between the two countries; and the people of Burma were keenly affected by the fact that this trip, which we had hoped was to be but one of many, proved to be his last visit to all of us in Burma. We share with the people of India the loss of their great leader.

May I also extend my deep condolences to the people of Nigeria on the loss of their late Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa? Nigeria is a country with which we enjoy very friendly co-operation, in this Committee as well as in other international forums; and we share with the Nigerian people their sorrow in losing the distinguished founder of their nation.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): First of all. Mr. Chairman, I should like to welcome you personally in your capacity as the new representative of Burma in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, and to say that we are sure that the close collaboration on disarmament questions which has always existed between our delegations in this Committee will continue,

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I should now like, in accordance with instructions received from my Government, to bring to the notice of the Eighteen-Nation Committee the following Aide-Mémoire of the Soviet Government.

"According to official statements of the United States Government and reports in the Press, a United States B-52 bomber carrying nuclear weapons crashed on 17 January 1966 over the Spanish coast. As a result

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of this accident, four hydrogen bombs, each of them a hundred times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, fell on Spanish territory and the coastal waters of the Mediterranean Sea. The detonator of at least one of these bombs exploded, and radioactive substances were released. There is a danger of radioactive contamination also from the other hydrogen bomb, which is lying at the bottom of the Mediterranean Sea. A large and densely populated area is threatened with radioactive contamination. Naturally, the peoples are profoundly perturbed by all these facts.

"The Soviet Government draws attention to the fact that the activities which have resulted in the aforesaid events are at variance with the generally accepted principles and standards of international law and with those obligations which the United States Government has assumed under international treaties and agreements in force, and, in particular, under the 1963 Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water.^{1/} As is well known, the principal aim of that Treaty was to prevent the radioactive contamination of the atmosphere, of outer space and of the waters of our planet. Accordingly, the parties to the Moscow Treaty, including the United States, declared their determination "to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances". Yet the southern coast of Spain, and also the adjacent maritime waters, have now been exposed to radioactive contamination from United States nuclear weapons.

"The contamination of the sea cannot be confined to Spanish coastal waters, which are not isolated from the waters of the high seas. A very real threat of contamination of the high seas has been created, which is contrary to the principle of the freedom of the high seas long since established in international relations. Thus the 1958 Convention of the High Seas, signed and ratified by the United States, which requires each State to take measures "for the prevention of pollution of the seas or air

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space above, resulting from any activities with radioactive materials or other harmful agents"^{1/}, has been violated. How did all this come about? It may be said to have been a mere accident. But it is permissible to put the question: What kind of policy is this, what kind of activities of the military authorities are these, which lead to such dangerous accidents? It is enough to put this question to perceive that the practice itself of flights by United States aircraft carrying nuclear weapons over the territory of other countries and over the high seas involves the possibility of such consequences. No one can guarantee that if such flights continue, similar consequences can be excluded in the future.

"United States Government officials have themselves repeatedly referred to the danger of a war breaking out as a result of miscalculation or an incident; yet the flights of United States bombers with nuclear weapons on board involve the danger of precisely such a situation.

"The Soviet Government has repeatedly warned the United States Government of the dangers connected with the flights of bombers carrying nuclear weapons. The United States Government, however, has not heeded these warnings, and the flights of United States aircraft continue as before. What happened over Spain shows how well-founded were the warnings given by the Soviet Union.

"What must be done in order to preclude any possibility of a repetition of such dangerous incidents?

"It is quite clear that for this purpose it is necessary to put an end to flights by aircraft with nuclear and hydrogen bombs beyond the limits of national borders. These flights are a danger above all for the peoples of those countries whose governments permit the United States to use their air space for such purposes, countries which are enmeshed in the trammels of military obligations towards the United States. In addition,

^{1/} A/CONF.13/L.53, para.2.

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the activities of the United States create a threat to the safety also of the peoples of other countries. The fact that some governments are prepared to reconcile themselves to such flights does not alter the situation in the slightest. It is inadmissible that the safety of many peoples, not to mention the peoples of their own countries, should depend on certain governments that give their consent to such flights.

"In drawing the United States Government's attention to all the foregoing, the Soviet Government considers that the immediate discontinuance of flights by aircraft carrying nuclear weapons beyond the limits of national borders and the strict observance of the international agreements prohibiting the radioactive contamination of man's environment answer to the interests of the prevention of dangerous accidents and incidents likely to involve grave consequences for peoples, and to the interests of peace."

That is the text of the Aide-Mémoire of the Soviet Government, which has been transmitted to the United States Government. I request the Secretariat of our Committee to issue this Aide-Mémoire of the Soviet Government as an official Conference document.^{1/}

The Aide-Mémoire of the Soviet Government which I have just read out raises a question of extreme importance and extreme urgency, a question which is connected with an incident which has alarmed public opinion throughout the world. The catastrophe which occurred over the territory of Spain was of an extraordinary nature, threatening as it did the lives and health of a huge number of people. The release of radioactive substances as a result of the explosion of the detonator of a United States nuclear bomb has caused dangerous radioactive contamination in the Mediterranean area.

We cannot fail to draw attention, first of all, to the fact that the aforesaid events, which occurred as a result of flights by United States bombers carrying a nuclear load, are in flagrant contradiction with the generally-accepted principles and standards of international law, and with those obligations which the United States Government has assumed under international treaties in force, and in particular under the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests. What happened

^{1/} Circulated as document ENDC/169; see also Corr.1 (English only)

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in the area of the Spanish coast might, in certain circumstances, give an impulse to the development of much graver events and might even be the cause of the outbreak of a military conflict by accident.

It will be remembered that at the meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament held on 8 February the Soviet delegation gave a very serious warning of the danger of the incident that had occurred and spoke of the need to put an end to such an alarming situation (ENDC/PV.238, p.19). The representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, then tried to minimize the consequences of this disaster; but he could not refute the fact that Western Europe, by the determination of United States strategists and generals in NATO, is crammed with thousands of American nuclear bombs and is sitting on a nuclear volcano.

In all this, of course, there lies a terrible danger, and not only for the peoples of Europe. It should be borne in mind that round-the-clock flights by United States aircraft carrying nuclear weapons have long since given rise to protests throughout the world, and even in the United States itself. We are entirely in agreement with the London Times, which wrote in one of its leaders on 21 January that it was time to remove this menace from the skies and that it was time to prohibit flights by aircraft carrying a nuclear load in peace-time and over foreign territories.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly warned against the danger inherent in the irresponsible patrolling of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, as practised by the United States. The Soviet Union has called for the liquidation of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of troops from the territories of other countries, which is one of the integral tasks of our Committee. In the message of Mr. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC/167), this proposal has once again been submitted by the Soviet Government to the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

In drawing today the most earnest attention to the ominous event which occurred over Spain in connexion with the accident to a United States bomber carrying nuclear weapons, and to the danger of continued flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, the Soviet delegation proposes that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on

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Disarmament should issue an appeal for the immediate cessation of flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons beyond the limits of the national borders of States. The Soviet delegation considers that the urgency and importance of such an action by the Eighteen-Nation Committee are quite obvious, and hopes that the Committee will give due attention to this question and will address an appropriate appeal to the States concerned.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): Before beginning my statement I should like to welcome the Chairman as the representative of Burma, who has just joined our deliberations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. We have in the past had very useful contributions from the delegation of Burma, and we are certain that he will continue this excellent tradition.

The Canadian delegation has taken note of the statement of the representative of the Soviet Union, and in particular of his suggestion that this Committee might formulate some sort of appeal in regard to events such as that which happened over Spain. We shall examine his statement, including the communication from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and we may have something to say about it later.

At our meeting on 10 February it was agreed that, while the right of any delegation to speak generally on any or all of the disarmament problems with which we deal would not be restricted, beginning with this meeting and continuing for several following meetings delegations should speak on the non-proliferation problem (ENDC/PV.240, p.4).

We have been asked in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) (ENDC/161) to negotiate a treaty to prevent proliferation. The Canadian delegation would like to set before the Committee its views on certain aspects of our task. We shall not take up the Committee's time in repeating our views on the seriousness of the proliferation danger, the importance of concluding a non-proliferation agreement, and the necessity of making rapid progress towards this goal. We assume that our general attitude to non-proliferation is already known and is similar to the attitudes of all delegations here, because we all voted for resolution 2028 (XX), in which the points I have just referred to were stressed.

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The basic positions of the NATO and Warsaw Pact groups on a non-proliferation agreement are already reasonably familiar to us through the draft treaties which have been submitted by the United States (ENDC/152) and the Soviet Union (ENDC/164) respectively, and the explanatory statements which have been made about them. However, as we all recognize, the views of the non-aligned nations must be taken fully into account in the preparation of the final text which we hope to evolve here. The non-aligned world is represented on this Committee by eight very competent and experienced delegations, and we look forward with interest and anticipation to hearing from them in detail as soon as possible about the issues which they consider must be dealt with in an agreement which should be designed to gain universal acceptance. We have already heard with great interest the exposition of the views of the representative of India on this subject (ENDC/PV.240), and in a later intervention we intend to comment on certain points in his statement.

While we look forward to hearing in specific terms what the non-aligned nations represented on this Committee have in mind, a review of recent statements made here, in the United Nations General Assembly and elsewhere gives us at least a general idea of their preoccupations. In my statement this morning I propose to refer briefly to some of those preoccupations as we understand them, as well as to several other considerations which the Canadian delegation believes will also have to be borne in mind.

Most non-aligned representatives appear to agree that a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons should have provisions creating obligations upon the nuclear Powers not to disseminate nuclear weapons and, on the other hand, upon the non-nuclear Powers not to acquire them. Those provisions correspond to articles I and II of the United States and Soviet drafts. They cover the heart of the question, and must without any doubt be included in any eventual treaty. However, many non-aligned countries go on from there to put forward other measures which they feel should either form part of or be a very early sequel to a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

Undoubtedly the most important of these for the great majority of the non-aligned States is that the nuclear Powers should commit themselves to early action towards the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery or, as a less extensive measure, to action to freeze production of

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nuclear weapons. As the representative of Ethiopia put it in the First Committee of the General Assembly last autumn:

"So long as there is insecurity and legitimate fear on the part of non-nuclear States, so long as the 'have-nots' remain exposed to nuclear blackmail, so long as -- in the meantime -- the nuclear Powers continue their nuclear arms race, so long will self-denial on the part of the non-nuclear nations alone be no guarantee of the effectiveness of a non-proliferation agreement. Yet we are not doomed to failure in our efforts for a speedy conclusion of such a treaty, given the willingness of the nuclear Powers to accommodate the legitimate demands of those who are nuclearly dispossessed." (A/C.1/PV.1366, p.49-50)

The Canadian delegation fully agrees that nuclear Powers should be prepared to undertake obligations to balance those which the non-nuclear States are being asked to accept. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have indicated their readiness to begin nuclear disarmament, although their views as to how to do so are unfortunately not in harmony. The proposals recently reiterated in Mr. Johnson's message (ENDC/165) to this Committee provide a real opportunity to begin the destruction of some nuclear weapons and their carriers. However, the Canadian delegation shares the view, to which most non-aligned representatives who spoke at the General Assembly also subscribed, that the urgency of stopping the further spread of nuclear weapons is such that we should not allow action for this purpose to be prevented by insistence on simultaneous reduction of nuclear armaments.

Another matter which received much attention from non-aligned States at the recent General Assembly was the question of safeguards to deal with the peaceful uses of atomic energy. For example, the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, said:

"My delegation would first sincerely recommend that ... in connexion with an international treaty, participating States should accept to place their nuclear-power programmes under control by the IAEA. As a matter of fact, we consider it highly desirable that all States parties to any bilateral agreements, whether as importers or as suppliers of power plants and fuel elements, demand that such agreements be submitted to the IAEA safeguards system. An international framework of control for commercial activity in the

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nuclear-power field is becoming increasingly urgent in order to ascertain that reactors and related installations are utilized for peaceful purposes only." (A/C.1/PV.1365, p.26)

Canada welcomes this statement by the Swedish delegation and agrees with the views it expressed. Representatives may recall that on 24 August 1965 I outlined to this Committee the policy of the Canadian Government regarding sales of uranium. This was stated in the House of Commons by Prime Minister Pearson on 3 June 1965. He said, in part:

"Before such sales to any destination are authorized, the Government will require an agreement with the government of the importing country to ensure, with appropriate verification and control, that the uranium is to be used for peaceful purposes only." (ENDC/PV.226, p.12)

The Prime Minister recently reaffirmed this policy in the House of Commons.

The question of safeguards is dealt with in general terms in article III of the present United States draft treaty, and we are pleased to note the additional emphasis which was placed on it by President Johnson in his recent message. However, there is nothing about such safeguards in the draft of the Soviet Union. In the Canadian view this is a matter of considerable importance, and we urge the inclusion in the final text of suitable language to give effect to the principle suggested in the statement of the Swedish representative which I have just quoted.

A third consideration which has received much non-aligned attention relates to guarantees. At present there is no provision in either the United States or the Soviet text to provide any assurance of security for non-nuclear States which will be prepared to give up the right to acquire nuclear weapons. However, in their recent messages both President Johnson and Chairman Kosygin have recognized this problem and indicated a willingness to look for a satisfactory solution. They approach the problem from different angles, but their approaches are not mutually exclusive.

The Canadian delegation finds the principle behind the proposals -- a recognition of the need to make provision for the security of non-nuclear States which are asked to give up all possibility of becoming nuclear States -- to be entirely reasonable. However, the Canadian delegation agrees with the observations made by the representative of Italy at our meeting of 10 February regarding this problem, which is inherent in the Kosygin proposal, of distinguishing for the purpose of the treaty

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the States which might have nuclear weapons on their territory (ENDC/PV.239, p.12). In this connexion we have noted the comment made by the representative of Nigeria during the last General Assembly: after reiterating his request for assurances that non-nuclear States would not be threatened with nuclear weapons, he said:

"It may be that a line will have to be drawn between the security requirements of those non-nuclear Powers which are members of alliances which include nuclear Powers, and those of non-nuclear Powers which are not."

(A/C.1/PV.1373, p.48-50)

The Canadian delegation believes that this whole question of guarantees will need very careful consideration, and looks forward with particular interest to the views of non-aligned delegations on this point.

I next come to several considerations which the Canadian delegation believes are also of importance and on which we would hope to hear the views of other delegations in due course. The first of these relates to the question of withdrawal from the treaty, on which both drafts have articles. While we accept that provision for withdrawal should be included, it is our opinion that certain checks and restraints should be provided so that such a serious step could not be taken without appropriate consideration by an international authority. Because of this position we consider the United States formula the more acceptable of the two, for it does suggest certain preliminary steps before withdrawal; the Soviet approach, however, makes the process of withdrawal much too simple.

Another matter which deserves consideration is the question of review of the treaty at some stage, a point which is covered in the United States draft but not in that of the Soviet Union. It is our impression that the non-nuclear signatories of the treaty would not necessarily be prepared to obligate themselves in perpetuity when the conditions existing at the time of signing the treaty might well change in a relatively few years. It has even been suggested that the treaty should run for only a specified period, so that all signatories would be free to review the situation at the end of the period specified. In our opinion the question of reviewing the treaty or providing a specific time limit is one which should be thoroughly discussed before a final text is drawn up.

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I should now like to direct the attention of the Committee to the need to attach precise meanings to certain propositions and particular words that we have become accustomed to hearing or reading in the long discussions on preventing "dissemination", or "proliferation", or "the spread of nuclear weapons". These last three terms illustrate the need for precision in the use of words at the stage we have reached in the negotiation of a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons -- and here I use the expression in the last preambular paragraph of resolution 2028 (XX) (ENDC/161), We have seen from passages in the statement of the representative of India at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.240, pp.13 et seq.) that he attaches to "proliferation" a meaning to which we doubt that all delegations will subscribe. Thus, for a start, we should perhaps try to attach a precise meaning to "dissemination" and "proliferation" -- and, possibly to "the spread of nuclear weapons".

I hope I shall not be accused of pedantry in asking that this Committee formulate precise meanings for these and other expressions to which I shall refer later. In the view of the Canadian delegation the first condition for progress in the task we have been given by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 2028 (XX) is that we all understand exactly what we mean by the terms we use. What we want eventually is legal precision in a treaty.

We have all had experience with United Nations resolutions which represented a compromise attained through lengthy bargaining. Unfortunately, quite often the apparent consensus has been attained by using words or phrases which mean one thing to some of the parties and something else to others. I think delegations will agree that, whatever reasons may exist for using imprecise language in the United Nations, there is no place for it in the drafting of an international treaty.

My delegation believes that a number of words and phrases are used when this matter is discussed whose meaning is, unfortunately, not at all clear. We find that some of the expressions in the Soviet draft before us require definition. Representatives will have noted that in the United States draft specific definitions are supplied in article IV for some of the more important terms used. Detailed explanations of specific points can perhaps wait until we reach the stage of article-by-article examination of the draft treaties.

Meanwhile, however, the Canadian delegation -- and presumably other delegations -- would be helped by clarification of two or three terms so that we

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shall be in a position to make considered comments and so that we shall not be talking at cross-purposes. In the opinion of my delegation, it will be essential to incorporate into the body of the eventual treaty clear-cut definitions of the various terms used in order that all the potential signatories may appreciate fully what it is that they are undertaking. As illustrations, without going into great detail at this time, I might mention several examples of the imprecise or insufficiently-defined words or phrases which I have in mind.

The Soviet draft refers to "States possessing nuclear weapons" and "States not possessing nuclear weapons". But these phrases are not entirely clear without further definition. We wonder precisely what the Soviet Union means by the word "possession" in the context of a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

To approach the definition which we think should be given to the word "possession" in this matter, let us consider what we want to prevent by the treaty we hope to draft. The Canadian delegation thinks we want to prevent the greater danger of the outbreak of nuclear war which would certainly result if an increasing number of nations became independent nuclear Powers. "Independent nuclear Powers" could be otherwise defined as nations possessing nuclear weapons; that is, "possessing" in the sense of complete ownership of the nuclear weapons, sovereign and independent authority over their use, including use in warfare, without necessary reference to any other State or entity. By this definition, only the five existing nuclear Powers now have possession of nuclear weapons.

The United States draft treaty gives a definition of "nuclear State" which we believe would equate such a State to one "possessing nuclear weapons", the expression used in the Soviet draft -- if it were defined as I have just indicated. But it is clear that we have here a point which must be discussed carefully so that we can reach agreement on the term that is to be used in the treaty and on its precise meaning.

Another term needing explanation is the word "access" as used in statements by the Soviet Union and its allies. The definition of "access" in the Oxford English Dictionary is "approach; right or means of approach to; passage, channel". This definition does not, however, cover another possible distinction that comes within the category of time. One sense of "access" could be the state of being in physical contact, or being able to be in physical contact, with some object or defined area. Another meaning could have the connotation of progress, of a way being open to

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something or other. As an illustration of the first meaning, delegations here have access to the bar in the Czechoslovak salon. As an illustration of the other meaning, "Education gives its recipient access to wider employment opportunities".

When the Soviet Union says that certain nations should not have "access" to nuclear weapons, which of those meanings has it in mind? This is not a mere quibble; it is important that we should know as exactly as possible what the Soviet Union means by this word if we are to make progress in agreeing on the essential elements of a treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

In examining again the two texts which we presently have before us, my delegation has been struck not only by the numerous differences which have to be resolved but also by the many similarities of approach to be found in them. We are convinced that, with good will and the active participation of all interested groups represented in this Committee, we should in the next few weeks be able to make substantial progress towards the production of a sound and universally-acceptable treaty.

It has been stressed by a number of delegations, including my own, that the question of the spread of nuclear weapons has global implications. Perhaps it is true that the draft treaties before us are too orientated towards the situation in Central Europe. If this is to be corrected, the contributions of representatives from other parts of the world must be substantial and timely and must show evidence of genuine readiness to explain their points of view clearly, patiently and in detail.

We venture to suggest that it might help the non-aligned delegations if, in presenting their views on the additions or amendments they believe should be made to the draft treaties before us, they would make a rough draft of the article or articles they would like to see inserted or substituted for existing texts. There must also be a readiness to seek and participate actively in efforts to achieve compromise. In other words, progress now depends upon all of us, and the Canadian delegation looks forward to learning more about the views of all other delegations in our immediately forthcoming meetings.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland) (translation from French): Mr. Chairman, allow me first of all to welcome you among us. May I say how glad we are to see you again? I am sure that your presence will help to make our task easier.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

We have just heard an important statement by the Soviet delegation. The Polish delegation wishes to say at once that it supports the Soviet delegation's proposal that our Committee should make a serious study of the problems raised in the document and should consider the desirability of launching an appeal for the cessation of flights of aircraft carrying atomic weapons over the territory of foreign States.

I should now like to reply briefly to the points raised by the Italian representative at the meeting on Thursday 10 February. First of all, I wish to thank him for paying such close attention to my statement of 3 February (ENDC/PV.237) and to say that his grasp of my reasoning is excellent. To use his own words, I see -- "... a contradiction between the Western desire to conclude a non-proliferation agreement and the maintenance and development of some nuclear collaboration within the Atlantic framework". (ENDC/PV.239, p.13).

I appreciate the subtlety of the formula used by the Italian representative, who speaks of "some nuclear collaboration within the Atlantic framework" -- a formula sufficiently vague to lend itself to a variety of interpretations. The Polish delegation cannot, for its part, dissociate this formula from the current discussions among members of the Atlantic alliance on such "nuclear collaboration", or from the intentions repeatedly expressed by the highest authorities of the Federal Republic of Germany, to obtain access to nuclear weapons.

I do not intend here to enter into an argument with the Italian representative about his definition of a non-proliferation agreement, but I feel that his definition leads him to conclusions with which I cannot agree. Mr. Cavalletti seems to be suggesting that, since a non-proliferation agreement would not in itself constitute a disarmament measure, one should not expect it to lead to a slowing-down in the arms race between the two military alliances, or to a modification in the "military arrangements and collaborations of the alliances, whether conventional or nuclear" (ibid.) In other words, the Italian representative would like us to accept a non-proliferation agreement leaving the Atlantic alliance entirely free to adopt various measures of "nuclear collaboration".

In the Polish delegation's opinion such a conception of a non-proliferation treaty is contrary to the letter and spirit of resolution 2028 (XX) (ENDC/161) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its twentieth session. This

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conception would give the Atlantic alliance and its members a privileged position vis-à-vis the other signatories of the treaty by creating inequalities which the Indian representative very rightly denounced in his speech the day before yesterday. (ENDC/PV.240, p.16).

Lastly, if we left the various alliances free to develop their "nuclear collaboration" as Mr. Cavallotti would like, we should run the risk of stimulating the arms race and increasing international tension. A non-proliferation agreement of that kind would thus have the contrary effects to those which we seek through collateral measures. Instead of facilitating and promoting disarmament, we should be running the risk of compromising it.

The Italian representative understood me very clearly when I said the other day (ENDC/PV.237, p.27) that the draft treaty submitted by the United States delegation was not a draft void of any loop-holes because it is based on the concept of the prohibition of the transfer of nuclear weapons to "national control". Mr. Cavallotti seems to see a contradiction between this position of mine and my delegation's vote at the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly in favour of resolution A/RES/2033(XX) on the denuclearization of Africa, of which operative paragraph 6 reads as follows:

(spoke in English)

"Urges those States possessing nuclear weapons and capability not to transfer nuclear weapons, scientific data or technological assistance to the national control of any State, either directly or indirectly, in any form which may be used to assist such States in the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons in Africa;"

(continued in French)

I have quoted this text in English because it is in line with the Italian representative's interpretation. Nevertheless, I should like in passing to point out that the French text of this resolution differs from the English and Russian texts. It was probably not by chance that the Italian representative, too, quoted the English version (ENDC/PV.239, p.14). In any case, I do not attach much importance to this difference: I should merely like to observe that the word "national" is not to be found in the French version.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

But let us leave aside this difference of texts and return to the English text. The question is whether there is any analogy between the resolution on the denuclearization of Africa and the draft agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. I say there is no analogy, nor can there be one, for the two documents pursue different objects. The first aims at transforming the African continent into a nuclear-free zone, and it is the principle of denuclearization which determines the duties and obligations of all African countries, and the obligations of States possessing nuclear weapons. In fact, the obligations of the nuclear States arise from the duties and obligations assumed by the African countries themselves.

The use of the words "national control" in paragraph 6 of resolution A/RES/2033 (XX) does not change this situation in any way. They cannot modify the obligations arising from the adoption of the Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa that the signatories shall refrain from "testing, manufacturing, [acquiring], using or deploying nuclear weapons on the continent of Africa." On the other hand, the introduction of the concept of national control in a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would open loop-holes which we must close if we do not wish to encourage those who make no secret of their intention to acquire nuclear weapons in one way or another and use them to further policies which would endanger peace.

I should like to end my speech by associating myself with the Italian representative's appeal: "Let us try to make a mutual effort at comprehension and good faith ..." (ENDC/PV.239, p.14). Let us respect the meaning of those words and not seek to dissociate them from the subject to which they refer.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The general debate with which the work of this session of the Committee started appears to be coming to an end, and one can already take stock of some of the results of this debate.

The Soviet delegation fully shares the concern of many delegations at the lack of progress in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. Dissatisfaction with the work of the Committee has been expressed here by representatives of the non-aligned countries and the socialist countries. Everyone realizes that

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the reason for this unsatisfactory state of affairs in the Committee is the policy "from a position of strength" pursued by the United States and the ensuing United States course of action aimed at increasing international tension, further intensifying the arms race, and bringing nuclear weapons within the reach of the West German Bundeswehr through combinations and agreements within NATO.

The resumption by the United States of barbaric bombing of the territory of the Sovereign State of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the extension of United States military operations in South Viet-Nam, including the waging of chemical warfare against the Viet-Namese population, have still further complicated the situation and increased tension. All these events are a clear indication that the United States is continuing to carry out its imperialistic policy "from a position of strength", its policy of intervention in the internal affairs of other States.

The development of international events in this direction has emphasized with particular force the need to adopt urgent measures which, in the present aggravation of the international situation, could bar the road to war and halt the further intensification of the arms race. The opinion of the Soviet Government concerning the programme of these urgent actions is set out in the message of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Kosygin, to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, dated 1 February 1966 (ENDC/167). We should like to express our satisfaction at the fact that this message of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR has met with a wide favourable response among the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

In our opinion, the constructive spirit of the statements which we have heard from the delegations of the socialist and non-aligned States in the Committee also augurs well for the work of the present session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. We listened with great satisfaction and understanding to the statement of the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Hussein Khallaf, a statement imbued with a sense of political responsibility, to the effect that the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America are no longer satisfied with mere

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appeals to carry out disarmament, however high-sounding these appeals may be, but are themselves taking the initiative and calling for a decisive transition from words to deeds (ENDC/PV.235, p.36). In this connexion we can only welcome the statements made by representatives of the non-aligned countries on the need to convene a world disarmament conference not later than 1967.

We also regard as an auspicious sign the agreement of most delegations that the cornerstone of the Committee's work should be discussion of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The urgency of a solution to this problem has been fully evident in almost every statement, and a general determination has been expressed that the Committee should begin without delay the practical work of drafting a comprehensive treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

This is not the first year in which we have dealt with the problem of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. An alarm signal regarding the imminent danger was given as early as 1961 in the resolutions of the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. The participants in that session expressed their conviction that --

"... an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons is growing more imminent and threatens to extend and intensify the arms race and to increase the difficulties of avoiding war and of establishing international peace and security ..." (A/RES/1665(XVI)).

Everyone recognizes that the problem of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons is not a minor, not a technical question. It is a major political question directly connected with nuclear disarmament, which, as is acknowledged throughout the world, alone can remove from mankind the threat of a nuclear war. Much has been said in the General Assembly and in the Committee to the effect that an increase in the number of countries directly possessing nuclear weapons or having access to them through military alliances will increase tension in international relations and increase the probability that this

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monstrous means of mass destruction will be used. To prevent the development of events in this direction is a universal problem -- it affects all States, no matter what political system they adhere to or on what continent they are situated. If we now succeed in solving this problem, nuclear disarmament will be greatly facilitated; if, on the contrary, we fail, there is no doubt that the solution of our main problem -- general and complete disarmament -- will turn out to be far more complicated.

The Soviet Government, which took the initiative of raising the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons at the twentieth session of the General Assembly, stated firmly and quite definitely that in seeking for the conclusion of an agreement on this question it had no desire to formalize and perpetuate the monopoly of the great Powers in nuclear weapons. I should like in this connexion to recall the statement made at the meeting of the General Assembly on 24 September last year by the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Gromyko:

"It goes without saying that an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons cannot be an aim in itself. This is a step, and a major one, towards the banning and destruction of nuclear weapons, and not simply a method of restricting the number of nuclear Powers, or, as some people say, of formalizing the nuclear monopoly of the present five great Powers. This is how the Soviet Union sees the purport of such an agreement." (A/PV.1335, p.26).

In proceeding to examine the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, we cannot fail to take into consideration the fact that this problem is far more acute today than, for instance, five years ago at the time of the sixteenth session of the General Assembly. We are led to this conclusion primarily by the fact that at the present time there has been a substantial increase in the number of States possessing potential capabilities of embarking in the next few years on the dangerous path of participation in the nuclear arms race. According to the calculations of the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. Seaberg, thirteen States are already in a position to start creating their own nuclear potentials. It cannot be doubted that such a turn of events will bring about further tension and arouse concern throughout the world.

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But what is particularly alarming is the fact that the forces now greedily reaching out for nuclear weapons -- and this is something that we cannot pass over -- are precisely those which in the past have twice unleashed a world war and have now again chosen the path of militarism and revanchism. The ruling circles of the West German Federal Republic do not conceal their revanchist intentions. Realizing that their revanchist plans cannot be accomplished by peaceful means, these circles have taken the path of intensified militarism. The West German Bundeswehr now possesses the most modern weapons. It lacks only nuclear weapons, and we now see how, step by step, the West German revanchists are increasing the pressure of their demand to be given access in one way or another to nuclear weapons.

The dream of acquiring their own nuclear weapons is not one that has just been born in the heads of the West German militarists. For some years already West German specialists have been conducting nuclear research on a vast scale and in the greatest haste on the basis of the several dozens of reactors which have been built in West Germany. Of course, for the time being all this is done under the guise of the peaceful use of atomic energy, but responsible experts in the West consider that all this should be seen in the context of the creation by West Germany of its own nuclear potential.

Let us turn to authoritative Western sources. According to an estimate of the British Institute of Strategic Studies, the reactors at present in operation in the Federal Republic would alone be capable of providing material for the production of ten atomic bombs a year if the plutonium produced as a result of the operation of these reactors were to be used for military purposes. According to the information of this same British institute, the nuclear potential of West Germany will increase to 170 atomic bombs a year by 1972. Thus the ruling circles of the Federal Republic of Germany, having embarked upon the path of the nuclear arms race, will in fact be able to start mass production.

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The West German leaders do not hide the fact that above all they need nuclear weapons. They speak of this openly, without scruple. You are all undoubtedly well aware of the joint memorandum of a group of leading generals of the Bundeswehr, which was much talked of in its time, in which the demand was put forward as early as 1960 that the Western German army should be equipped with nuclear weapons. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany did not remain deaf to these appeals. At the Conference of the Christian Democratic Union in Kassel on 10 October 1964 Chancellor Erhard stated: "We must place at the disposal of our soldiers those weapons which our potential enemies possess." I do not think that this statement needs any comment. Everybody understands with what weapons the head of the West German Government wishes to equip the Bundeswehr; they are of course nuclear weapons.

During Chancellor Erhard's December visit to Washington he openly insisted on the demand that the Federal German Republic should be regarded as having equal "rights" with all others in NATO, and that it should not be subjected to "unjust discrimination" in the sphere of nuclear weapons. These demands of the head of the West German Government recall to mind the clamour raised in pre-war Germany about the "Versailles humiliation" and the "right" of Germany to rebuild the Wehrmacht, its right to equality with all others in respect of armaments. Everyone knows how all that ended.

The West German leaders realize, of course, that they cannot now acquire their own nuclear weapons in contravention of the Potsdam Agreements. They also realize that any attempt by the Federal Republic of Germany to manufacture and test its own nuclear weapons or to acquire them as its own property will meet with a powerful and unanimous reaction of protest and opposition from the overwhelming majority of governments and peoples throughout the world. That is why they have now chosen a camouflaged and devious way of obtaining access to nuclear weapons within the framework of the NATO military alliance. This was the purpose of the visit to Washington at the end of last year of the emissary of Bonn, Mr. Birrenbach, and then of Chancellor Erhard himself.

In seeking to obtain access to nuclear weapons the revanchist circles of the Federal Republic of Germany naturally come out as the most militant opponents of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately the leading

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Western Powers, and first and foremost the United States, have apparently not so far decided in favour of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Their position is still ambivalent. As before, they try to combine the incompatible. They wish to sign a treaty which, in regard to national ownership, would apparently prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but would at the same time leave to the Western Powers the possibility of making nuclear weapons available to their allies that do not possess them, through collective access to nuclear weapons within the framework of the NATO military bloc, or of carrying out some other plan that would satisfy the nuclear aspirations of Western Germany.

Is this not shown by the fact that, while conducting negotiations on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the leaders of the NATO Powers are at the same time making much ado about the alleged right of the Federal Republic of Germany to participate in the disposal of nuclear weapons within the framework of the NATO bloc, to have a share in the division of nuclear responsibility within the framework of this bloc? Thus the Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Manlio Brosio, has asserted that the right of Germany to determine its own fate should be reflected in NATO nuclear agreements.

In commenting on this statement at a press conference on 6 November 1965 the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, emphasized that the Germans were interested in nuclear agreements within NATO, interested in the nuclear defences of NATO and interested in nuclear policy. For this reason an endeavour was being made to work out a nuclear agreement within the framework of NATO which would satisfy all these elementary demands. In the communiqué on President Johnson's meeting with Chancellor Erhard in December of last year it was also acknowledged that the Federal Republic of Germany and other interested partners in the alliance should have an appropriate part in nuclear defence.

In NATO and in bilateral meetings of representatives of the Western Powers various plans are still being discussed, the purport of which, whatever may be said, amounts essentially to one and the same thing -- how and to what extent to satisfy the increasing claims of West Germany to obtain nuclear weapons.

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It is obvious that our common task is to agree on a comprehensive treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and thus put an end to all such claims and aspirations in regard to nuclear weapons. At the first meeting of the present session of the Committee the Soviet delegation expressed its readiness to proceed to a discussion, article by article, of a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.235, p.20). Almost all the members of the Committee who have spoken here have welcomed this move by the Soviet delegation. Nobody has expressed any objection to our proposal. Apparently at present the most rational procedure for our work is precisely the examination of a non-proliferation treaty article by article. We should like to begin this examination today.

Two draft treaties on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, a Soviet draft (ENDC/164) and a United States draft (ENDC/152), have now been submitted for the consideration of the participants in the negotiations. It suffices to put these two treaty texts side by side and compare them article by article to see immediately both what there is in common in both treaties and the deep fundamental differences which separate the positions of the sides. Outwardly the two draft treaties have much in common: both the Soviet and the United States drafts consist of a preamble and seven articles. Although the preambles of the two texts cannot be considered identical, they contain quite a number of common provisions proclaiming such aims as the lessening of international tension, the achievement of general and complete disarmament and so on.

The texts of the Soviet and United States draft treaties also largely coincide on such questions as the permanent operation of the treaty and withdrawal from it, the order of signing, accession, ratification and so on, which are questions of a formal nature. On the whole they are drafted in similar terms, and their harmonization should not apparently entail any difficulties. But that part of the work should, in our opinion, be carried out in the final, so to speak, the finishing stage of negotiations on this question. At present it is important to concentrate all our attention on the provisions forming the core of the treaty and defining the main commitments of the parties to it, commitments aimed at closing all ways, both direct and indirect, to the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

If we are to begin with the main thing, we should first carry out an objective analysis and comparison of the first two articles of the Soviet and United States

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draft treaties and answer the question: which of them corresponds to the solution of the problem of the comprehensive prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons?

First of all, it is as plain as a pikestaff that in the United States draft treaty -- namely, in its first and second articles -- there is manifested the ambivalent approach of the United States to the solution of the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We agree that this draft closes a number of channels for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It prohibits first, the direct manufacture of nuclear weapons by all non-nuclear States; second, the direct transfer of these weapons to non-nuclear States; third, the transfer of such weapons "into the national control" of non-nuclear States through military blocs; fourth, the rendering of assistance by nuclear States to non-nuclear States in the manufacture of these weapons.

However, the words "into ... national control", which are insistently repeated in these articles of the United States draft, in point of fact mean that the nuclear Powers, while undertaking not to transfer nuclear weapons directly or through military alliances into the hands of one or another non-nuclear State or group of States, may give control over these weapons to a multilateral nuclear force or other combined nuclear force of a military alliance. As a matter of fact Mr. Foster himself acknowledged at the last session of the Committee that this document does not prevent the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force (ENDC/PV.232, pp.17 et seq.).

At the first meeting of the present session of the Committee we listened to the message of the President of the United States, Mr. Johnson, to the Committee (ENDC/165), which was read out by Mr. Foster. Having carefully acquainted ourselves with this document, we should like to say frankly that we have not seen anything in it that would introduce modifications of principle into the United States position on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In President Johnson's message there is a reference to prohibition of the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear States only into "national control." But, I repeat, this is not enough. All channels through which nuclear weapons may find their way into the control of non-nuclear States must be closed.

It is impossible to solve the problem of non-proliferation by limiting ourselves to prohibition or to renunciation of the acquisition of nuclear weapons into national ownership, under national control or at national disposal, while on the other hand

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affording the possibility to one or another non-nuclear State or group of States to obtain access to nuclear weapons in one form or another within the framework of a military alliance. The prohibition of both the aforesaid forms of access to nuclear weapons by non-nuclear States is an integral part of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

But this is precisely what the United States is attempting to ignore in proposing that an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should not cover the form of proliferation of nuclear weapons by which non-nuclear States would gain access to them within the framework of the NATO military alliance. This position of the United States shows that actually it is seeking to bring American nuclear weapons within the reach of the non-nuclear States that are its allies in the NATO military bloc. Herein also lies the fundamental difference in the United States approach to a non-proliferation treaty itself. Precisely in this point lies the most vulnerable spot in the United States position, which we certainly cannot accept if we really wish to solve the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and not to attempt to use a non-proliferation treaty to obtain a military advantage for the NATO bloc, for the non-nuclear Powers which are members of it.

The Soviet delegation would like once again to emphasize most strongly that the agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons must be comprehensive, and must not be a legal basis or cover for some third category of non-nuclear States to obtain access to nuclear weapons through various kinds of within-bloc agreements on the ground of the so-called sharing of nuclear responsibility among NATO members. It was precisely to this aspect that the representative of India, Mr. Trivedi, drew attention when, in his statement at the meeting of the Committee on 15 February, he said:

"... the treaty must prohibit all aspects of proliferation, direct or indirect, through military alliances or otherwise and in any form or shape. As a non-aligned nation we are unable to understand why members of military alliances should receive a special dispensation in the context of non-proliferation. There cannot be three categories of nations: nuclear nations, non-nuclear nations in alliance with nuclear nations, and non-nuclear non-aligned nations." (ENDC/PV.240, p.16)."

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Further Mr. Trivedi declared: "We should not create a third category now and retard our progress towards the ultimate objective." (ibid.)

I should like to state here quite categorically that, whatever may be the intentions of the United States and other Western Powers in connexion with the plans which are now being discussed in NATO, the Soviet Union will never agree to West Germany obtaining access to nuclear weapons. The policy pursued by the Federal Republic of Germany may be approached in different ways; but one thing is absolutely clear: access by West Germany to nuclear weapons would be a new source of increasing tension in Europe and would create a direct threat to European States. All this would nullify any attempts to conclude an effective international treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

I should like to recall that apprehensions of this kind have been expressed not only by the Soviet delegation. At the last session of the United Nations General Assembly we repeatedly heard from the rostrum statements by the representatives of various States to the effect that plans for the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force hampered the solution of the problem of non-proliferation. Thus, for example, the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Mbah, speaking in the First Committee of the Assembly, stated:

"It seems that one at least of the obstacles to agreement is the military arrangements now being contemplated by the NATO Powers." (A/C.1/PV.1356, pp.21, 22)

The representative of Kenya in the First Committee also gave a warning about the danger involved in the carrying-out of plans for the creation of a multilateral nuclear force:

"Looking at the problem in its wider sense, we feel that the proposed NATO multilateral nuclear force, if it ever came into being, would hamper the implementation of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in Central Europe ..." (A/C.1/PV.1364, p.3)

Being convinced of the need to close all channels to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the majority of States Members of the United Nations voted in favour of concluding a treaty which --

"... should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form;" (A/RES/2028 (XX); ENDC/161)

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The draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which was submitted by the Soviet delegation to the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly (ENDC/164) fully corresponds to the solution of this problem. The main provisions are set out in articles I and II of the Soviet draft treaty. The wording of the Soviet draft treaty is sufficiently clear and explicit, and the delegations of a number of States at the General Assembly asked that it be taken as the basis for discussion. In this connexion I should like to recall the evaluation of the Soviet draft treaty which the representative of Syria made in his statement:

"The important thing is not to obtain a consensus on no matter what text; the important thing is to agree on a text without ambiguity which, by its very clarity, may command respect for its provisions. That is why the draft treaty proposed by the USSR seems to us, at this stage in our deliberations, to be the one more likely to mark the starting point for our efforts."

(A/C.1/PV.1362, p.27)

Here in the Eighteen-Nation Committee the representatives of the Western Powers try to pretend that they do not understand what the Soviet Union has in mind when it speaks of access to nuclear weapons, of participation in regard to nuclear weapons. Today's statement by the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, provides evidence of these attempts of the representatives of the Western countries. I think that the texts themselves of articles I and II of the Soviet draft treaty make this question perfectly clear. I shall now read them out in full so as to dispel any ambiguities that may exist in the minds of the representatives of the Western Powers in regard to this question.

Article I, paragraph 1, reads:

"I. Parties to the Treaty possessing nuclear weapons undertake not to transfer such weapons in any form -- directly or indirectly, through third States or groups of States -- to the ownership or control of States or groups of States not possessing nuclear weapons and not to accord to such States the right to participate in the ownership, control or use of nuclear weapons."

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"The said Parties to the Treaty shall not transfer nuclear weapons, or control over them or over their emplacement and use, to units of the armed forces or military personnel of States not possessing nuclear weapons, even if such units or personnel are under the command of a military alliance."

Article I, paragraph 2, reads:

"2. Parties to the Treaty possessing nuclear weapons undertake not to provide assistance -- directly or indirectly, through third States or groups of States -- to States not at present possessing nuclear weapons in the manufacture, in preparations for the manufacture or in the testing of such weapons and not to transmit to them any kind of manufacturing, research or other information or documentation which can be employed for purposes of the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons."

Article II, paragraph 1, of the Soviet draft treaty reads:

"1. Parties to the Treaty not possessing nuclear weapons undertake not to create, manufacture or prepare for the manufacture of nuclear weapons either independently or together with other States, in their own territory or in the territory of other States. They also undertake to refrain from obtaining nuclear weapons in any form -- directly or indirectly, through third States or groups of States -- for purposes of ownership, control or use and shall not participate in the ownership, control or use of such weapons or in testing them.

"The said Parties to the Treaty shall not seek to acquire control over nuclear weapons or over their emplacement and use for units of their armed forces or personnel thereof, even if such units or personnel are under the command of a military alliance."

Article II, paragraph 2, reads:

"2. Parties to the Treaty not possessing nuclear weapons undertake not to obtain or seek to obtain, from States possessing nuclear weapons, assistance in the manufacture of such weapons or relevant manufacturing, research or other information or documentation which can be employed for purposes of the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons."

Article III also relates to this. It is brief, and I shall take the liberty of reading it out as well:

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

"The Parties to this Treaty shall refrain from offering any support, encouragement or inducement to States seeking to own, manufacture or exercise control over nuclear weapons."

Those are the basic articles of the Soviet draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In the message of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to our Committee, paramount importance is given to the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. That document emphasizes that --

"The draft agreement ... which the Soviet Union has submitted to the Committee is permeated with a single aim, namely, to block all paths to the further spread of nuclear weapons." (ENDC/167, p.2)

The message contains a very important provision which, as may be judged from the favourable comments of many governments, fully answers to the desires of peace-loving States to put an end to the dangerous process of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and facilitates the achievement of an agreement on this question. We are referring to the willingness, expressed in the message, of the Soviet Government --

"... to include in the draft treaty a clause on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the treaty which have no nuclear weapons in their territory." (ibid., p.3)

This willingness of the Soviet Union assumes all the more significance in the light of the fears expressed by the governments of a number of non-nuclear States and, first and foremost, of non-aligned countries. These countries connected their fears with the possibility that their renunciation of the manufacture of their own nuclear weapons might be prejudicial to their national security. At the present time, as is quite obvious, if the aforesaid proposal of the Soviet Government is adopted there will be no grounds for such fears. The acceptance by all the nuclear Powers of this proposal of the Soviet Government would be an important and timely response to the commitment of non-nuclear States to refrain from manufacturing their own nuclear weapons.

Many members of the Committee have well understood the sense of the proposal submitted by the Soviet Government and have given it their full support. The representative of Nigeria, Mr. Ijewere, stated:

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"My delegation is accordingly very interested in this new Soviet proposal, which we welcome. We are also convinced that the proposal, if acceptable to the other nuclear Powers, would go a long way towards facilitating the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty which would prevent the spread of nuclear weapons". (ENDC/PV.237, p.34)

In conclusion, we should like to emphasize that comparison of the first two articles of the Soviet draft treaty and the United States draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons inevitably leads us to the following conclusions:

- (1) The main shortcoming of the United States draft treaty, and a very dangerous one, is that it leaves open the possibility of non-nuclear States participating in nuclear weapons through the NATO military alliance;
- (2) In contrast to the United States draft treaty, the Soviet draft treaty fully answers the purpose of effectively preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and provides for the prohibition of all ways and means of spreading nuclear weapons, either directly or indirectly in any form.

For this reason we believe that the Soviet draft treaty, as it fully answers the purpose of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, should be taken as the basis for agreement on this question.

We hope that our Western colleagues will regard in a business-like manner the critical remarks made by the Soviet delegation and other delegations and that, showing a constructive approach to the matter, they will not insist on a treaty containing any exceptions, as the United States draft treaty does, but will support the Soviet comprehensive draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

I wish to emphasize once again that the Soviet Union insists on a treaty which, in accordance with the appeal to us by the United Nations General Assembly, would not contain any loop-holes for the proliferation of nuclear weapons or any exceptions. Only in that case could the treaty be a step towards a situation in which the very concept of "nuclear Power" would disappear altogether.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): First, let me welcome you, Mr. Chairman, as you join our meetings for the first time this session. My delegation and I look forward to working with you in the future on the very important tasks of this Committee.

Now I should like to take a few minutes to set forth some views of my Government on the problem of nuclear proliferation.

We believe, first of all, that in order to make progress towards a solution of this problem we shall have to settle this question: what is the evil that a non-proliferation treaty should be designed to prevent? There have been arguments here as to whether the evil is existing proliferation or further proliferation. There have been attempts to substitute for the word "proliferation" a different and wholly undefined concept called "access". As Mr. Burns pointed out this morning, "access" is an extremely vague word in English.

Let us look at the history of our negotiations for a description of the evil at which they have been aimed. The first General Assembly action taken specifically on this subject was the so-called "Irish resolution" of 1961, resolution 1665 (XVI), which, of course, found prominent reference in resolution 2028 (XX) (ENDC/161), adopted last year. The Irish resolution described the evil as "an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons". It expressed the Assembly's belief in the necessity for an international agreement--

"... whereby the Powers producing nuclear weapons would refrain from relinquishing control of such weapons to any nation not possessing them and whereby Powers not possessing such weapons would refrain from manufacturing them ..." (A/RES/1665 (XVI)).

This, in our view, aims at the heart of the proliferation problem; and this resolution, as we all know, was adopted unanimously.

Resolution 2028 (XX), adopted last year, uses the words "proliferation", "non-proliferation" and "proliferate" some dozen times. As we all know, however, it does not refer to the loose concept of "access". Resolution 2028 (XX) thus points to proliferation as the evil to be dealt with. It does not, however, define that word. As Mr. Burns has suggested this morning, let us decide on a definition now. In our view, proliferation results when a non-nuclear-weapon

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nation acquires its own national capability, or right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the explicit, concurrent decision of an existing nuclear-weapon nation. From the days of the Irish resolution the aim has been to prevent the spread to additional nations of such independent power to fire nuclear weapons. Let us agree now that that is our aim. If we do, we shall have a better chance to make progress than if we interject into the discussion such concepts as "existing proliferation" or "access".

The definition of "proliferation" which I have submitted to the Committee is wholly consistent with the past views of my delegation and, I believe, with the guide-lines provided by resolution 2028 (XX). Thus, on 8 November 1965 my delegation presented its interpretation of the first principle of non-proliferation contained in that resolution. That principle, it will be recalled, says:

"The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form".

The meaning we then attached to the word "proliferate" is clear from my delegation's statement about this principle, which was:

"We agree that there should be no loop-holes, and the United States draft treaty permits none ... The United States draft treaty, if adopted, would not permit any non-nuclear country to acquire nuclear weapons, national control over nuclear weapons, the power itself to fire nuclear weapons, or access to information on manufacture of nuclear weapons."
(A/C.1/PV.1373, p.37)

President Johnson used similar language in speaking about the way we proposed to carry out this first principle. He said:

"We are prepared to work with other countries to assure that no non-nuclear country acquires its own nuclear weapons, gains national control over nuclear weapons, achieves the power itself to fire nuclear weapons, or receives assistance in manufacturing or testing nuclear weapons. We are prepared to agree that these things should not be done directly or indirectly, through third countries or groups of countries, or through units of the armed forces or military personnel under any military alliance." (ENDC/165, p.1)

(Mr. Foster, United States)

This shows clearly our view that proliferation occurs whenever a non-nuclear-weapon country acquires its own national capability, or independent right or ability, to fire nuclear weapons. By "independent" we mean, of course, without the explicit, concurrent decision of an existing nuclear-weapon country.

In this concept of proliferation there is no special dispensation for non-nuclear-weapon States which are members of military alliances. It is clear, of course, that nations which have freely banded together for collective defence against threatened attack have done so because they have found greater strength in numbers than they had alone. Western Europeans know, moreover, that many hundreds of Soviet missiles with nuclear warheads are aimed at them. Is it any wonder that they wish to be allied with a nuclear-weapon State? Is it any wonder that they are vitally interested in arrangements for their own defence against nuclear attack? As long as a threat of this kind to their security exists, they will want collective ways to counteract it. Under the United Nations Charter, collective defence is open to them as it is to others; it is not a special dispensation available only to a few.

In this connexion, none of the defence arrangements in existence or under discussion among NATO members would involve relinquishing nuclear weapons to the national control of any non-nuclear-weapon nation, now or at any time in the future -- I repeat: at any time in the future. Nor would any such arrangement assist any such nation in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. They are entirely consistent with, and indeed they reinforce, the concert of non-proliferation which I have described. There can therefore be no question of inconsistency between them and a non-proliferation treaty. Both, as a matter of fact, seek the same objective.

The United States concept of proliferation is also consistent with the second principle of resolution 2028 (XX), that "The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers". In explaining my Government's support of this principle to the First Committee on 8 November 1965, I said:

"As we understand operative paragraph 2 B," -- that is, the second principle -- "it seems directed essentially to the association of a non-proliferation treaty with the various related measures on which

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certain speakers have placed emphasis. The United States agrees that a non-proliferation agreement is not an end in itself, and that we must press forward with related collateral measures. My Government has a keen interest in this objective. It has proposed, and continues vigorously to advocate, a number of specific proposals for related measures. What is important is that we make progress where we can, when we can. We must be careful not to condition agreement on one measure or another, so that we achieve a complete impasse and block chances for any significant arms control and disarmament progress anywhere." (A/C.1/PV.1373, p.38-40).

This shows clearly that my Government did not regard the second principle as requiring that a non-proliferation agreement be conditioned upon any other measure, even a measure proposed by the United States. In his intervention on 15 February, the representative of India said (ENDC/PV.240, pp.16 et seq.) that resolution 2028 (XX) required that we embody in the non-proliferation treaty two other separate measures, one of which sounded like the United States proposal for a cut-off of production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons, and the other of which sounded like the United States proposal for a freeze on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ENDC/120). We should be delighted to see these measures adopted. We should like to explore the steps of nuclear disarmament which might be taken if they were. But I doubt that many who voted for resolution 2028 (XX) thought that they were supporting the idea that a halt in production of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles had to be embodied in the non-proliferation treaty called for urgently by the resolution.

The essence of a non-proliferation treaty is the distinction between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. While it is in the interests of both to contribute toward the common goal of non-proliferation, by the very nature of the problem the contributions from nuclear-weapon countries will have to be of a different nature from those of non-nuclear-weapon countries.

This inherent distinction was present in connexion with the limited test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1), but there it worked the other way: non-nuclear-weapon countries accepted only theoretical limitations upon themselves, but the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States accepted immediate and concrete

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inhibitions related closely to their national security as they saw it. They did so because such a treaty was in their own interests and in the interests of mankind in general, even though an element of discrimination might be said to have existed and even though not all atmospheric testing stopped.

Proliferation is as great a threat to the security of the present non-nuclear-weapon States as it is to nuclear-weapon States -- and in some instances it is a greater threat. Non-nuclear-weapon nations which attempt to block progress toward non-proliferation by linking it with other measures which one side or the other cannot accept may find themselves much worse off some years from now if the bomb spreads to yet more countries. On this point I agree with the remarks made by the representative of Czechoslovakia at our meeting of 1 February. He said:

"Attempts to link non-proliferation to other measures could only complicate an already difficult situation, and delay and make more difficult the reaching of agreement." (ENDC/PV.236, p.15)

Before concluding, I should like to refer to one other non-proliferation principle contained in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX). That is the one stating that the treaty should contain provisions to ensure its "effectiveness". When this principle was under negotiation, the main issue was whether it was to include a clearer reference to the International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent international safeguards. We think it a mistake that it did not, because wide support for such safeguards was voiced during the debates.

We recommend that, in the light of this support, the treaty contain as strong a provision for safeguards as is possible. We welcome Mr. Burns' suggestion that the provision in the United States draft (ENDC/152) be strengthened in the light of Mrs. Myrdal's intervention last autumn. But the argument on this principle of the resolution was about the effectiveness of the treaty's provision for safeguards, not about which parties would have to sign. We are therefore at a loss to understand how it can be implied that the principle somehow can be read as a General Assembly mandate that one particular party join the treaty.

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On another subject, and exercising my right of reply, we believe that many delegations here are bored with the tiresome repetition of statements about the Federal Republic of Germany which are so far removed from the real facts of life. It is regrettable that, as the interval shortens before yet another nation may explode a nuclear device, our precious time here is wasted by a renewal of unwarranted attacks against the Federal Republic of Germany and against the legitimate concern of NATO nations with their self-defence. Such unfounded charges are obviously not in keeping with the tone and the substance of our task here: the determined search for a way to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons. They have in the past been characteristic of Soviet statements before this body. But we should have hoped that, with the urgent injunction of the nations of the world to make every effort to stop the tide of proliferation, we should hear more than a repetition of polemics from the Soviet Union.

It is all the more unnecessary as these Soviet charges have been fully answered on several occasions by my Government and by other governments. Recently, on the occasion of Chancellor Erhard's visit to the United States, to which the Soviet representative has referred this morning, President Johnson and the Chancellor specifically reaffirmed the importance both Governments attach to the quest for a non-proliferation agreement.

I shall, however, undertake to correct the misunderstanding and distortion we have heard of United States policy regarding the relationship and alleged priority between non-proliferation and nuclear sharing. As the Western European NATO countries look across the arbitrary line that divides this continent, they see ranged against them a threat to their existence posed by those hundreds of Soviet missiles. It is clear that these countries have a legitimate interest in the strategic nuclear deterrent which protects them from this threat. One of these countries, the Federal Republic of Germany, stands in the front line of NATO's defences. Yet, despite its vulnerable position and despite the fact that the German people are cruelly divided, the West German Government has committed its armed forces entirely to NATO's military command and has repeated countless times its renunciation of the use of force for attainment of political ends and its desire to settle the German boundaries question by peaceful negotiation only.

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As for nuclear weapons, I can assure the Committee that every nuclear weapon that the United States has placed in Europe, including those in the Federal Republic of Germany, is under United States custody and control. Moreover, there can be no question about the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany. The leaders of its Government have emphatically denied that they seek nuclear weapons. It is the only nation which has voluntarily pledged itself not to manufacture atomic as well as chemical and bacteriological weapons. Its peaceful nuclear reactors, to which reference was made this morning, are all under international safeguards. Since the Soviet Union is well aware of these facts, we are only led to conclude that there are political objectives quite removed from the matter of a non-proliferation agreement that serve as motivations for these continued unfounded attacks.

The Soviet Union is also aware of the facts regarding the suggestions that have been made for increased consultation and shared responsibility among NATO members in the nuclear field. The Special Committee of Defence Ministers was established last year to discuss ways of improving present communications and consultations among the members of the Alliance concerning their nuclear defence. It can hardly be argued, particularly by the Government that is responsible for having emplaced the missiles that threaten the European members of NATO, that these nations do not have a legitimate concern to look to their defence against such a massive nuclear threat. The concept of the Special Committee is firmly rooted in the United States policy of non-proliferation, since its work will in no way result in the dissemination within the Alliance of nuclear weapons or the design information to make such weapons.

That is also the case with all the proposals that have been made for arrangements for allied nuclear defence. In fact, these proposals are not only consistent with our desire to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but are also an outgrowth of that policy. I can assure the Committee that the United States would enter into only such arrangements as would prevent unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, safeguard and protect nuclear design data from dissemination to non-nuclear weapon countries, and require an affirmative United States decision for the use of nuclear weapons, thereby precluding independent use by any other nation.

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Thus the nuclear policy of the United States with respect to its allies is founded on the principle of non-proliferation. There can be no question as to the priority between the two, because they are mutually reinforcing. I would thus hope that this Committee could proceed with the serious task of negotiating an agreed non-proliferation treaty without being subjected to further pointless polemics on the thesis that present or future NATO nuclear arrangements are incompatible with a non-proliferation treaty. We should not forget that proliferation is not exclusively or even primarily a European problem, but a world-wide problem; and we should bear this constantly in mind in proceeding with our deliberations.

We are somewhat encouraged by the start this morning of an article-by-article comparison of the draft treaties by the representative of the Soviet Union. We shall ourselves gladly continue with this process of comparison, which will show how clearly our draft treaty will help to achieve the objectives which we believe all delegations here wish to achieve.

I again wish to exercise my right of reply with respect to the Soviet representative's statement concerning the unfortunate collision of two United States Air Force aircraft over the coast of Spain. One is led to wonder what purpose lies behind the repetition of false allegations about this incident, and why the Soviet representative asked to be the first speaker today just to read a note delivered yesterday to my Government by the Soviet Government in Moscow. Presumably, if the Soviet Government had something other than propaganda in mind, it would have awaited a reply through diplomatic channels. As I said at our meeting of 8 February in referring to this unfortunate collision:

"Such accidents are extremely rare, but they are included in United States contingency planning with respect to nuclear weapons. No nuclear explosion occurred, because the controls designed to prevent such an explosion by accident performed as they are intended to perform." (ENDC/PV.238, p.20)

Last Tuesday President Johnson sent to the United States Congress the fifth annual report of the Agency which I have the honour to head -- the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. In his letter accompanying that report, the President said that the world is "approaching a critical period in efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons." He added that the major task of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency will continue to be the search for ways to avoid

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nuclear proliferation. The President continued: "I have instructed our negotiators to walk the extra mile necessary to ensure that the weapons of war submit to man's need for peace."

My country, my Agency and my delegation are deeply committed to this goal. We firmly believe that, with the understanding and co-operation of all of us in this Committee, we can and we will succeed in eradicating the evil of proliferation before it is too late. If we do so, our agreement will surely stand in history as a milestone on the road to a peaceful world.

As a footnote, may I express my regret that the affairs of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency require my presence in Washington for a certain period? Legislative hearings concerning the Agency's business have been scheduled to take place very soon. Consultations with other officials of the United States Government are in order, and several other meetings which require my attention are coming up in the next week or so. While in Washington I shall follow the Committee's work closely, and I shall return to the Committee as soon as I possibly can. I wish you, Mr. Chairman, and this Committee every success in this urgent task of achieving an agreement on non-proliferation.

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I should like to express my thanks to the representatives of the Soviet Union, Canada, the United States and Poland for welcoming me to this Committee.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 241st meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador U Maung Maung, representative of Burma.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the Soviet Union, Canada, Poland and the United States.

"The delegation of the Soviet Union tabled an Aide Mémoire of the Government of the Soviet Union dated 16 February 1966 to the Government of the United States (ENDC/169 and Corr.1).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 22 February 1966, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

